The second of four briefings to set context for the Masterclass series on The World in 2025, scheduled for Friday, 31st January 2025, 6:30 pm and Friday, 7th February 2025, 6:30 pm. Read Briefing #1 on the US-China relationship here.
On the surface, it might look like the risks arising from potentially worsening wars across two regions—Europe and the Middle East—have somewhat lessened with Donald Trump assuming office as President on January 20. But look deeper, and risks still remain quite considerable. The spectre of war hovers in the zone of uncertainty.
In the Middle East the truce is still highly fragile. Hamas is portraying the truce as a “win” to its people; Israel is still flexing military muscle to bring Hamas to heel. In Europe, war continues unabated though some of the key parties concerned—Washington and Moscow—are making statements that could be construed as early signs that an end to the war is somewhere in the offing.
The Israel-Hamas-Hezbollah Factor
Aboard Air Force One on January 26, the US President Donald Trump while discussing war-ravaged Gaza stated: “I’d like Egypt to take people. And I’d like Jordan to take people… You’re talking about probably a million and a half people, and we just clean out that whole thing and say, 'You know, it’s over’.” It was a suggestion that was apparently rebuffed by both Egypt and Jordan, but expectedly welcomed by Israeli officials as “an excellent idea”.
Meanwhile, the fragile truce between Israel and Gaza dragged on, with Hamas agreeing, once again, to release additional hostages and Israel, in turn, allowing Palestinians to return to the northern part of the Gaza Strip. The truce is a part of an envisaged three-phase deal to bring peace.
The first phase is six weeks long. It involves the temporary ceasefire currently in force, should see a limited exchange of prisoners, the return of Gazan refugees and the withdrawal of Israel’s forces to areas no more than 700 metres inside the Gaza-Israel border, though this excludes the Netzarim Corridor, the militarised belt bisecting the Gaza Strip. Israel is, however, clear that it will tolerate no violations at all.
The second and third phases are expected to define and deliver the pathways to a permanent ceasefire and the complete withdrawal of Israel from the Strip, but there are no written guarantees from any of the key parties involved. Qatar is a key mediator, highlighting its growing political influence in the region.
The Iran-Syria-Lebanon Factor
Peace in the region will necessarily involve Iran’s compliance, and Tehran, though subdued, is still unbowed. The former US President Joe Biden maintained that Iran “is weaker than it’s been in decades,” with its strategic allies, Hamas and Hezbollah weakened, the Assad regime in Syria gone, and the economy struggling amidst US sanctions.
But its nuclear programme has advanced far further than it was in 2023; the military capacity, the drone and ballistic missile fleets and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) are still in place. So are Iran’s allies in Yemen and Iraq.
In February last year US Central Command said its forces had destroyed an Iranian underwater drone, in Houthi waters near Yemen. It was the first time that Houthis had operated such a drone that was similar to a torpedo and particularly effective against static ships in port or in anchor. Iran has also just unveiled a new counter-drone platform reportedly based on the Skynex system manufactured by Germany’s Rheinmetall.
Tehran’s naval fleet makes it quite a threat in the Persian Gulf which is home to some of the world’s most crucial oil and gas sources. Heightened risks in the Persian Gulf could send global oil and gas markets into a frenzy, a key reason why the US has thus far maintained a leash on Israel and a wider war in the region.
The broader game to add a new layer of complexity to potential US actions over Iran continued, with Putin and his Iranian counterpart, Masoud Pezeshkian, on January 24, signing a fresh “comprehensive strategic partnership treaty” covering trade and military cooperation.
Syria is still a somewhat uncertain factor with doubts over the Hayyat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) leader, Ahmad al-Sharaa’s, capacity to bring rebel leaders like Ahmad al-Awda, widely known as Russia’s man in the southern parts of the country, to a unified table. The authorities under HTS maintain that they are still capturing weapons destined for the Hezbollah transiting the Lebanon-Syria border. The capability of the HTS to manage the complex administrative problems in a country of diverse groupings, sects, and religions, and one still eyed by both Iran and Russia, are unknown.
Countries like Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt worry over hardline Islamists disrupting or coming to power in Syria, and though the Biden administration indicated it would lift sanctions and trade restrictions that could help a post-Assad Syria, Trump’s priorities in the country are unclear.
In Lebanon, Israel is unwilling to withdraw from its positions in the south until Tel Aviv is convinced the Lebanese government fulfils its part in the ceasefire, Israeli spokespersons have maintained. Israeli forces continue to maintain fire with “warning shots”, and the ceasefire has now been extended to February 18, pending a longer peace agreement. Any agreement will involve Lebanon preventing the Hezbollah from taking military action, and Beirut’s capacity to do so is still in considerable doubt.
The Russia-Ukraine Risks
Meanwhile, a Russian advance in Ukraine’s Donetsk region continues, and Ukraine, in turn, continues to send drones into Russia. In Moscow, the Russian President, Valdimir Putin, sought to score brownie points with President Trump, stating: “I can’t help but agree with (Trump) that if his victory had not been stolen in 2020, then maybe there would not have been the crisis in Ukraine that arose in 2022.” Across the Atlantic, the new US Secretary of State Marco Rubio put an immediate freeze on US aid globally, pending a review, leaving open the question of Washington’s aid to Ukraine.
The Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, however, sought to argue that Rubio’s act would not substantially affect the aid to Ukraine, and demanded that Kyiv should be included in talks to end the war, adding his oft stated argument that Putin had little or no interest in ending the war.
Trump added to good measure that he would like OPEC+ to bring down oil prices, thereby putting economic pressure on Putin, but the Saudis and other oil powers might not be willing to play ball with global demand conditions still uncertain.
In Europe, and crucially in Ukraine’s capital, Kyiv, the worries over the solutions to the war, and the complex question of the reality, or unreality, of the Russian President Vladimir Putin’s threat to the continent, persist. In large measure, several European leaders want Russia’s economy and military weakened, and the Putin regime dismantled.
On January 22, Kaja Kallas, the former Estonian prime minister and current EU foreign policy chief told the European Defence Agency in Brussels: “Many of our national intelligence agencies are giving us the information that Russia could test EU’s readiness to defend itself in three to five years.” It’s not exactly clear if Trump thinks otherwise and Europe remains vulnerable to his administration’s policies, with its economy in deep trouble and questions persisting on spending over defence and NATO.
China remains a factor in the Russia-Ukraine equation. It has ostensibly sat out the war, even while quietly allying with Russia. Beijing is quietly watching Moscow weaken both in terms of its economy and military, and a Moscow as Beijing’s junior partner in China’s rivalry with the US will only benefit the Chinese. Yet, any appearance that Russia has lost its war with Ukraine will only make its axis with Russia and Iran look weaker.
In conclusion, uncertainty prevails. Russia and Ukraine will probably come to the table and a truce could come about with the Trump administration’s machinations, but Europe will remain uncertain about its future. And in the Middle East, a truce notwithstanding, the ghosts of the past will continue to haunt long into the future.
Dig Deeper
The Middle East
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/15/what-do-we-know-about-the-israel-gaza-ceasefire-deal
The Russia-Ukraine War
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cjw4q7v7ez1o
Read Briefing #1 on the US-China relationship here.
