[A handshake in Jerusalem: US Secretary of State Marco Rubio with Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during Rubio’s Middle East visit in September 2025. After the strike on Doha, the contradictions of the US-Israel relationship are harder to hide. Photo by US Embassy Jerusalem, via Flickr, CC BY 4.0]

On September 9, an Israeli airstrike struck Doha, Qatar — a dramatic escalation that expanded the Gaza war beyond its borders. Israel said it was targeting a Hamas leadership safehouse. Hamas and Qatari officials countered that the strike killed only junior operatives and a Qatari security officer.

The symbolism was unmistakable. For the first time, Israel had attacked an Arab nation that was a key American ally. Qatar also hosts the forward headquarters of US Central Command (CENTCOM).

In doing so, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sent three messages at once: to Hamas, that no sanctuary was safe; to Arab mediators who quietly back anti-Israel groups, that they could no longer stand apart; and to Washington, that Israel could act unilaterally, even at the risk of unsettling its closest ally.

The strike on Doha has turned a grinding local war into a regional reckoning — testing Israel’s ambitions, exposing Arab divisions, and forcing Washington to confront the limits of its power, while China waits with its cheque book.

The fallout was immediate. On September 17, Qatar convened an Emergency Arab-Islamic Summit. The communique condemned Israel’s “blatant aggression” and called for a review of diplomatic and economic ties. But the summit stopped short of signaling any near-term military action — a sign of both restraint and constraint. The next day, the US vetoed a UN Security Council resolution demanding a permanent ceasefire and unrestricted humanitarian aid to Gaza — its sixth such veto since the war began.

Arab leaders faced intense pressure to act but were pulled apart by political divisions — and by the presence of around 40,000 US troops spread across the Gulf. Economic interests continued to drive partnerships even amid public anger. Even as Qatar hosted the summit, Egypt deepened energy ties with Israel and US energy giant Chevron, linking gas supplies from Israel’s Leviathan field to Egyptian facilities. Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s (MBS) pragmatic, economics-first diplomacy, balancing relationships with both Washington and Beijing, would have been another restraining factor.

Events moved quickly. Israeli tanks and troops launched “expanded military operations” in Gaza, while Netanyahu vowed to hunt down Hamas leaders “wherever they are,” asserting a right to defend Israel “beyond its borders.”

Inside Israel, criticism was growing. Opposition leader Yair Lapid warned that Netanyahu’s strategy risked leaving Israel isolated: “No one in the world understands what Israel wants… everything is amateurish, careless, and arrogant.” His words captured a deeper unease: that the war was being shaped less by national strategy and more by Netanyahu’s struggle for political survival.

Hovering over all this was the United States. Washington publicly urged restraint, but its actions told a more ambiguous story. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s visit to the region offered warm praise for Qatar’s “mediation efforts” — even as Washington reaffirmed its “ironclad commitment” to Israel’s security. For Trump, this dual messaging played well with his MAGA base at home, where Israel has become a potent symbol for evangelical and nationalist voters.

Behind the scenes, reports swirled of a controversial plan led by Trump adviser Jared Kushner and former British Prime Minister Tony Blair to redevelop Gaza into a lucrative real estate hub once the war ended.

These events underscore deeper questions about the complexity of Arab political unity and Washington’s role as the region’s security guarantor.

Israel’s Escalation and the Smotrich Shock

The strike on Doha was part of a calculated escalation. Netanyahu’s government had been planning for months to break out of Gaza’s borders. When the tanks rolled in on September 17, Netanyahu declared that Israel would “pursue Hamas wherever they are.”

But the Gaza war is about more than military strategy. It is also about domestic survival. Netanyahu’s fragile coalition has been under pressure for months. In July, the ultra-Orthodox United Torah Judaism party walked out, followed by the Shas party, which quit the government but not the wider alliance. The prime minister has been governing with a razor-thin majority, dependent on far-right partners whose demands grow more strident as the war drags on.

Lapid, Israel’s opposition leader, has been unsparing in his criticism. In August, he warned: “The hostages will die, soldiers will die, the economy will fall apart, and our international standing will collapse.” After the Doha strike, he accused Netanyahu of pursuing a reckless personal agenda rather than a coherent national strategy.

Then came an even more startling revelation — not from Netanyahu, but from his finance minister. On September 17, Bezalel Smotrich described Gaza as a “real estate bonanza” that could “pay for itself.”

“We have paid a lot of money for this war,” Smotrich said. “Now we need to see how we are dividing up the land in percentages. The demolition — the first stage in the city’s renewal — we have already done. Now we need to build.”

Smotrich claimed that he had “already started negotiations with the Americans” and that a formal business plan sat on President Trump’s desk. His comments added fuel to reports that Kushner and Blair were quietly pitching a redevelopment vision for Gaza — luxury real estate, ports, tourism zones — funded by Israeli and US investors.

If true, this would turn Gaza from a battlefield into a prize. It would also explain Washington’s reluctance to put real pressure on Netanyahu, despite mounting international condemnation. For the US and Israel, Gaza would no longer just be about security. It would be about profit and permanence.

Internationally, backlash has been growing. Several European countries have formally recognized Palestine and are considering targeted sanctions on Israel. Netanyahu’s aggressive stance has left Israel increasingly isolated — with only Washington providing consistent cover through its UN vetoes.

But Washington’s support has limits. The more Netanyahu pushes beyond Gaza, the harder it becomes for the US to maintain its triple role as ally, regional power broker, and security guarantor. Smotrich’s “bonanza” vision challenges not just Arab states but America’s credibility itself.

Arab Unity or Illusion

While Netanyahu escalated on the battlefield, Arab leaders scrambled diplomatically — but the summit in Doha exposed both their differences and their underlying interdependence.

Two days before the summit, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) reaffirmed its collective security agreement, first signed in 2000: an attack on one member would be treated as an attack on all. This was a symbolic show of unity with Qatar, but in practice its effect was limited. Many GCC states host significant US forces, making independent action difficult without Washington’s consent.

The final summit communique pointedly avoided naming Hamas, revealing deep divisions. For many Arab governments, Hamas is a double-edged sword — viewed by their publics as an Islamic resistance movement, but privately seen as a destabilizing force. Saudi Arabia and the UAE, in particular, were angered by Hamas’ October 2023 attack on Israel, which derailed their rapprochement plans under the US-brokered Abraham Accords. This ambivalence makes collective action nearly impossible: publicly condemning Israel while privately blaming Hamas creates a delicate balancing act.

Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan have been exploring an Arab-Islamic plan for Gaza’s future. Qatar already operates a Gaza Reconstruction Committee led by its ambassador Mohammed Al Emadi. Meanwhile, Lapid has floated an alternative plan: placing Gaza under temporary Egyptian administration to stabilize the enclave. Such proposals highlight the region’s competing visions — and the reluctance of key players like Cairo to take on the risks.

Even as leaders met in Doha, contradictions were on display. Egypt’s new pipeline deal with Israel and Chevron highlighted how commerce often moves faster than politics. MBS continued his “zero problems” approach, balancing ties with Iran, Israel, and China.

Practical fears also loomed large. Egypt and Jordan worried about a flood of Palestinian refugees if Gaza collapsed. Turkey added another layer of volatility. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has positioned himself as a vocal champion of the Palestinian cause and has ambitions of leading the Islamic world. As a NATO member, any Israeli strike on Hamas figures operating from Turkish territory could trigger consultations under NATO’s collective defense provisions — a scenario Washington and European allies are desperate to avoid.

The Doha summit ultimately gave Qatar political cover to resist Netanyahu’s demand to expel Hamas leaders or “bring them to justice.” For Doha, giving in would have been unthinkable: it would have cost Qatar prestige across the Islamic world and undermined its role as a mediator. Yet refusal risked escalating tensions with Israel and its allies, leaving Qatar squeezed between its core Islamic leanings and its Western partners. This standoff also exposed the limits of Arab unity. Economic and political needs stood in sharp contradiction to Islamic solidarity, leaving Arab leaders unable to agree on whether to confront Israel directly, focus on humanitarian aid, or quietly preserve ties with Washington.

Washington’s Double Game

For decades, Washington has cast itself as the indispensable security guarantor and power broker in the Middle East. But after the strike on Doha, its contradictions are harder to hide. Its words promise stability. Its actions suggest self-interest.

Rubio’s September visit captured this tension. In Jerusalem, he stood shoulder-to-shoulder with Netanyahu, reaffirming America’s “unbreakable bond” with Israel. His language was bluntly pro-Israel, aimed squarely at Trump’s evangelical MAGA base at home.

Then, in Doha, Rubio’s tone shifted slightly. He met Qatar’s Emir, Tamim bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, and praised Qatar’s “mediation efforts” and spoke of shared goals for regional stability. The formal statement issued by the US Department of State afterward were deliberately vague, offering no specifics about the deep security partnership between Washington and Doha — including the presence of CENTCOM’s forward base at Al-Udeid, a critical but sensitive part of the relationship.

Washington cannot afford to alienate Doha — even as it shields Israel diplomatically. Qatar’s links to the wider Islamic world, and its financing of religious movements and organisations, have allowed it to play a central role as a mediator across conflicts—from Afghanistan to the present moment. It underscores Washington’s limits.

This balancing act is becoming untenable. The Kushner-Blair plan for Gaza’s redevelopment — combined with Smotrich’s public comments — suggests that Washington’s role is not neutral at all. If Gaza’s future is shaped by commercial consortia tied to U.S. interests, then America’s vetoes at the UN look less like strategy and more like investment protection. However, the US has consistently used the veto to signal its solidarity in the past.

The Saudis are taking note. On September 17, Riyadh signed a Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement with Pakistan, implicitly extending nuclear deterrence. It was a signal to Washington: Saudi Arabia is quietly hedging its bets, preparing for a future where the U.S. may no longer be the region’s sole guarantor. It’s a development that India needs to watch carefully.

Trump faces his own balancing act. His May visit secured hundreds of billions of dollars in Gulf investments into the U.S. economy. His administration now must juggle Israel’s demands, Qatar’s indispensability, and Saudi Arabia’s ambitions — all while managing a volatile domestic political base.

Netanyahu’s scheduled meeting with President Trump on September 29 will be pivotal. If Trump restrains Netanyahu, Washington may preserve its role as broker. If not, its limits will be laid bare — and Arab states will accelerate their search for security and diplomatic alternatives, including deeper engagement with Beijing.

China’s Quiet Rise

China has been largely silent on the Gaza–Doha crisis, but its influence is steadily growing. Over the past decade, it has built ports, pipelines, and power plants from the Gulf to the Levant. Its Belt and Road Initiative has turned capital flows into strategic leverage, giving Beijing a growing economic footprint in the region.

Arab capitals now maintain an active channel with Beijing. Riyadh’s reconciliation with Iran, brokered by China in 2023, was an early sign of this shift. Saudi hedging is not only military but financial, and if reconstruction in Gaza moves forward, Chinese finance and firms are likely to demand a role.

Economics currently eclipses politics. Qatar, which backs some of the more orthodox strands of Islam and groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, sells LNG to China and other Asian buyers on long-term contracts.

Yet China has its own constraints. Despite its military base in Djibouti, Beijing has avoided direct involvement in regional conflicts, preferring to send signals of diplomatic solidarity while championing a two-state solution. Its aim is to shape the Middle East’s post-war order by writing the cheques, not by deploying troops.

At home, however, Beijing faces a delicate challenge. China’s policies toward its restive Muslim population, especially in Xinjiang, are aimed at curbing fundamentalism but risk being seen very differently by more orthodox audiences in the Arab world. At the 19th National Party Congress in 2017, Xi Jinping called for the “sinification” of all religions, urging efforts “to lock in the achievements made in the sinification of Islam… and to promote the healthy transmission and development of Islam.” These policies, while domestically focused, cast a shadow over China’s regional diplomacy.

Scenarios Ahead

Looking ahead, three scenarios emerge. The next phase will hinge on Israel’s military decisions — and on how external players, from the U.S. to Qatar, shape the diplomatic and economic narrative.

Containment: Washington builds the guardrails and dictates policy to Tel Aviv. Israel halts cross-border strikes, Qatar, with US support, brokers incremental ceasefires, and Egypt and Jordan ring-fence spillover risks. Arab anger is channelled into humanitarian aid and reconstruction, rather than open confrontation.

Escalation: Netanyahu refuses to play ball and continues his pursuit of Hamas leadership, with collateral damage in Qatar, Egypt or Turkey. The conflict with the Arab world deepens. NATO is tested by Turkey. Iran-aligned groups open new fronts in Israel’s north, drawing in a peace-seeking Syria and Lebanon deeper into the conflict. Oil and gas markets spike. Global leaders scramble desperately to find quick solutions with the threat to their economies. Israel’s isolation intensifies.  

Stalemate: Washington vacillates and Qatar equivocates. Meanwhile, the internal opposition to Netanyahu grows in power, and imposes some limits on further military action. A temporary cession of military activities ensues. Gaza remains in a state of uncertainty, and humanitarian concerns grow. Hedges multiply, and threat risks rise. Plans for Gaza’s reconstruction proceed piecemeal, without political cohesion or financial settlement—breeding radicalization and setting the stage for future wars. China’s quiet capital potentially creates the space to make deeper inroads as an influencer. 

The Closing Dilemma

The strike on Doha turned a grinding war into a regional reckoning. It’s a decisive moment for the Trump administration. Will the U.S. choose commercial opportunity and short-term deals or long-term stability?

Either way, the Middle East has entered a new bargaining season. The strike on Doha has redrawn the map of power. Hard power still matters, but so do the balance sheets — and the bargains struck between faith, force, and finance will decide the region’s future.